No. 27

<The pure logic as formally apriori *mathesis universalis* preceding all other sciences. The most universal materially eidetic set of types of the world and its universally material apriori. Considerations on possible, *a priori* incompatible worlds and communities>[[1]](#footnote-1)

The struggle with psychologism in the pure logic is the struggle for the truly pure logic itself, for the cognition that under this title a complete system of concepts, sentences, truths, theories, combined into a proper science, is absolutely accepted, that are „*a priori*“ according to their proper sense, i.e., have a truth that is independent of all actual existence of judging men, of de facto psychic experiences of judging, concluding, theorizing, understanding, etc., and then a truth as such, presupposing nothing of any other actual existence. There is, as will be shown, a sum total of truth, which everybody possibly judging has to accept, if something objective at all shall be able to be, if something objective shall be able to be a substrate of truths at all, theme of theories, of sciences.[[2]](#footnote-2)

Every science of facts, or, which has the same value, every science of experience, whether it judges physical things or men, psychic mental processes and abilities of men and whatever, loses its sense as a science, experiential truths lose their sense as truths, their objects [lose] their sense as objects, if the purely logical sentences in question are not accepted; or that, which belongs to the „sense“, to the „essence“ of possible truth as such, of a possible objectivity [314] as such, precedes all ascertainment from experience, all ascertainment of determinate objects that are to be determined individually from experience in such a way, and truths for the objects. It precedes, this means: However the fact may be fantasied as different, however we might abandon the fact and go over into the free realm of fantasy, as long as we shall be able to conceive of, to posit as being, anything at all as an object and a judgment related to that as a judgment, as long as these words shall be able to keep their identical sense that may be harmoniously kept up, that long are purely logical sentences accepted simply as such, which only analyze that, which is posited with the sense of possible objectivity (as possibly to be conceived of as being), and correlatively, <which> is posited with the sense of true judgments on possible objects, true judgments pure and simple, true judgements as possible premisses for possible consequences, etc.

That, which explains itself in special objectivities, special fields of objects that are investigated in the theoretical interest, from apriori reasons, this will thereby be understandable from final principles. We say: essentially understandable. It is accepted, because <to> deny it would violate the essence, the accepted sense of objectivity as such and <of> truths as truths on objectivities as such, it has a strict necessity of the apodictic acceptance, the violating of which is called countersense (absurdity). But cognition from fundamental necessity is not merely cognition from principles of this most universal dignity, from „formal“ principles of the pure formal logic and formal doctrine of the object, the *mathesis universalis* with its fundamental disciplines.

Objectivity as such (with its apriori formal variations: property as such, relation, connection as such, whole and part, quantity and number, series and ordinal number, etc.) is a title for the apriori forms, reaching in their universality as far as the meaning of the word „something as such“. And whatever may stand as something, whether something ideal or real, i.e. [whatever] may be a substrate for possible accepted predications (stand in possible relations, may be a member of connections, of whole things, function as a part, etc.), falls under this formal concept and its variations. Ideal objectivities as well, also thought through pure [315] form like numbers, may themselves again become objects for predications.

The *mathesis* does not ask whether ideal or real, it talks of an object, of something as such. But *a priori* the ideal thing relates back to a possible real thing, thus for example the ideal object „genre color“ relates to possible details in its „range“, to the species of colors, and through them to possible individual details. Thus the idea „formal objectivity“ points back to real things, and a conspicuous theme of <a> possible apriori, not thematically considered in the *mathesis universalis*, and not emphasized, emerges under the title real thing in the widest sense of the individual. Starting from the given realities, objectively determining themselves in this and that way, we say: all reality takes place in a universe of reality as a world, as the all of realities.

Let us start from the given world, from its single realities, the relations and connections, in which they function in a worldly way (connect into the unity of the world). If we consider the universal forms of such realities, the system of forms of connection and relation connecting them, then universal world structures stand out for us. The world has its most universal set of types that forces itself on us already under the guidance of the universal speech (in which it necessarily had to be reflected). The world as the all of realities is enclosed in the universal spatiotemporal forms, forms of unity, containing all single realities, and „forming“ them at the same time. Every single concrete real thing has its special spatial form (its extension), and all these forms fit to „the“ space, and have their place in it. And every partial extension, eventually each, however small it is, therein again every limiting „figure“ and every part, every point of the figure has its place, etc. We need to describe much here, not only with regard to the space and time, with regard to extension, figure, size, duration, motion, etc., but also with regard to real „change“, changing „conditions“, real properties, related to real circumstance, <to the> „causal“ dependencies, etc.

„Physical things“ are furthermore set apart, and the all-unity of the physical nature taken in allness, organic „bodies“, that [316] is, bodies for souls with psychic subjects, with changing psychic „acts“ of the suffering and acting, of the being affected, and actively reacting ones in an I-act, etc. We find men and animals in the world, as psychophysical entities of bodies with psychic subjects on the one hand, on the other hand as personal subjects, who know themselves to be in the world as their surrounding world, who consciously have an intuitional surrounding world, each [has] its surrounding world in its way of appearance, [who] consciously relate to this surrounding world, regarding it, valuing it, cognizing it in thoughts, effecting it. On the other hand though, we also find personal subjects (personal ones in a widest sense) in I-you-relationships, affecting other personal <subjects>, „motivating“ other personal <subjects>, determining themselves, each for itself, setting goals for oneself (self-education), etc. If we focus on the personalities in their personal relationships, then we meet peculiar entities as marriage, friendship, family, people, club, state, church, etc., that are realities as well in their way, belong to the world, and have quite <a> different worldly existence than the physical things.

If we thus overlook and describe the world, then we meet a universal apriori in the corresponding attitude, that is, beyond the formally mathematical [apriori]. Of course we can consider all that in a formal-mathematical way, performing a „mathematical universalization“, i.e., we can consider everything here purely as something or as a form of variation of the something: the sun as an object as such, the totality of its planets as a plurality as such, as a totality as such, their reciprocal attractivities as being related to one another as such, etc. If we considered the world objects as pure options, and let them vary freely, and abstracted even from the fact that they are individual or whether they are or not, but only, insofar as they are objects, then we would get into purely formal thinking, and, in pondering formal options and necessities, we would perform formal mathematics; the world would only be a realm for the examples.[[3]](#footnote-3) But we can also vary otherwise and arrive at a pure apriori that would remain below the [317] formal universality (in the sense of the formal mathesis). We stick to reality as reality, to the world as a world, but we go over from the individual actuality of this world to the pure option; we freely change it in fantasy, go through the variations, and only demand that all these variations coincide in the identity of one and the same universal thing, of one and the same essence.

We roughly procede in the following way: We take as a starting point a de facto thing, and we freely vary it (considering it as a mere option), only keeping its identity as a physical real thing as such,[[4]](#footnote-4) that is, only in the volitional change shall it get an identical universal essence. Then we immediately meet indefeasible necessities, it is necessarily *res extensa*, and its extension has the scope of its essentially possible variations in the infinite space that always and necessarily remains as a ready form. Likewise and already prior to that: It is necessarily something that is probably moved, changing according to its shape. Necessarily the extension is a qualified extension, and probably the thing is <somthing> qualitatively changing, etc.

We can take many things that are de facto there, and let them freely vary. We de facto find them in causal relations, their changes are dependent on one another. We can ponder whether we are able to think away the causality in free variation, whether we can consider things at all, that are only conceivable as such in the unity of a space and of a time, without their movements and qualitative changes being subject to the empirical rules of causality, etc. We could then furthermore consider the essence of the psychophysical real thing that is possible in a world anyway, but we ask, in how far it is necessary, whether a world without all psychic is conceivable, without cognizing subjects (whether on a stretch of time or in the world as such as <the> all of the real in the endless time as such).

Likewise we could eventually go over to universally considering the option of a world and in systematic theory, that is, [318] in a similar way as we consider the possible forms of objectivities as such in systematic disciplines, for example set-theoretically the possible sets as such at first, laws of sets as such, the numbers as such, the universe of possible numbers as a unity of the series of numbers, etc., thus <also> the possible forms of the world as such, the essential types of objectivities, of systems, of unities, relations, etc. that are to be gained in free construction according to apriori laws of construction, [essential types] of objectivities that emerge as real ones in a „compossible“ all of real objects, in a world, and can combine into the unity of a world. Since anyway personal essences can belong to an ideally possible world as such (if they do not have to [belong], which is itself questionable), then we can especially ask for the possible forms of personal relations between a subject and its surrounding world, of the possible interpersonal relations, for the possible (*a priori* possible) types of communities, like correlatively for the possible forms of community traditions, community performances in contrast for example to the possible forms of individual performances of a subject that is considered outside of the community in relation to its surrounding world it shapes in them, and to which it conveys a shape of value and a final shape from its acts, objectivating them, beyond their physical spatial shape.

The way we consider personal realities, men in the world, we consider realities that are not only in the world, but that are also related to the world in a conscious way, as Ego subjects, that do not exist „objectively“ among things, but have experience and cognizance and knowledge of the things, are conscious of them as „surrounding“ them, in proximity and distance, in the way of the bodily as an „organ“, as an organ of perception, as an organ of the will, „with the help of“ which other things have to be created from the Ego, to be changed according to the purpose or according to the current arbitrariness, etc. And here necessarily the titles reason and unreason emerge. Among the ideal possibilities of a world as such, we find the ideal possibilities of a world, into which the personal essences act in a reasonable way, which cognize it reasonably, value it reasonably, change its shape reasonably and that reshape it in detail and possibly proceeding according to an ideal possibility, interpersonally combining with one another, [319] into a world of reason, a „perfect“ one, whereby they, affecting one another, reciprocally and each for itself, shape themselves reasonably as well or are able to. Single personality <and a> majority of personalities, consciously and reciprocally in the social motivation related to one another are considered here in purely ideal option, in the essential attitude according to their necessarily possible essential forms, and more specifically then according to their reasonable forms, under the principles of the individual and social reason or correctness.

Thus we consider an Ego as such in purely apriori consideration in relation to its surrounding world (a world as such as its conscious surrounding world) according to its necessary and possible essential contents, and for example as a subject of theoretical, axiological and practical reason, and we ask for example for the most universal principles of such a reason, for essential laws, regulating its behavior thereby not de facto but in necessity, if it shall become certain of itself in an intuitive way as proceeding in a reasonable way, as effecting truth, beauty <and> something practically good. Likewise we consider social unifications, passing ones and lasting ones. We consider comradeships, friendships, marriages, family unities, ethnic communities, states, etc., and we transfer that, which we call as <standing> in the fact, into the realm of pure options, we do not consider de facto persons, but persons as such in pure option, and what kind of sense contents, and what kind of truth contents (reason contents) are predelineated by the sense of such forms, if they shall be able to not only be marriages as such, but „true“, „genuine“, „reasonable“ marriages or „genuine“ families, reasonable states, etc., the way we consider social formations of community like sciences under the aspect, when they can be called „genuine“, „true“ sciences, and which norms do they need to then meet according to their proper sense, their proper intention.

If we thus proceed, then we investigate the „principal“ of all sciences of reality (sciences of facts), that is, principal things as reality with regard to reality, with regard to the world as a world as such, and with regard to possible reality shapes as reality shapes. It turns out that beyond the formally mathematical apriori, that of [320] objectivity as objectivity, an apriori form for all possible reality exists, and that a world is not a conglomeration of realities, being for themselves and possible for themselves, but that a world as such is only possible under a system of categories of reality, and furthermore, that the possibilities that are to be shaped according to the most universal categories predelineate an apriori set of types, preceding all de facto existence. Thus the „mere“ nature has its physical and biological apriori, likewise the mind has its psychological apriori in nature. The forms of the common mentality have their special apriori, that is, a double one, depending on whether we consider possible forms of community as such or possible forms of community under the ideas of reason, which for its part can be a force, shaping in the communities themselves through norms that become conscious and guide in a reasonable way.

We have objectivities as themes in the sciences of the „mind“ and of culture (mental performances), that are to be considered as subjectivities and subjective formations under norms of reason, and therefore always present themselves as supposed „values“, can therefore also be questioned on their genuineness, truth, wherefore aspects of value can always enter into these sciences as well, and do enter. The way that „exact“ natural science only becomes possible through recourse on the principles of a nature as such, or rather, on the basis of the apriori (of the rational, grounding *a priori* in the true sense of nature as nature), the way that „merely empirical“ natural science, i.e., the one sticking to the individual fact, can only become an „explaining“, „rational“ science, if the respective sciences of principles are developed as purely apriori ones, in which possible nature as such explains its possible sense (in which alone it can possibly only) scientifically, then the same is necessarily accepted for the „sciences of the mind“. The apriori is the norm of the possibility and is shaping from scratch for the method of the rationalizing of the fact. (It teaches to „explain“ the fact rationally, to make it understandable from principles.) One of the options in question here in pure attitude, is that of the right.

[321]

Supplement XXV

How is the eidos world attainable through variation?

<Difficulties in the gaining of the eidos world, since there is not a ready fact as an examplary starting point. Differentiation of de facto experienced and horizonlike accepted world>[[5]](#footnote-5)

It is always a big risk that we get stuck in vague distant-universalities. The transition from <the> fact towards the eidos world is not that simple as for example that from the fact „this color“ towards color as such, although we need to carefully delimit there as well, for example this perceptual aspect color in its temporality. Here the fact (in its temporality) is given as some identifiable thing, a self-contained identical thing in itself. But the fact of the world as the one accepted by me is given - pregiven.

I need to distinguish the world that is de facto experienced now, accepted by me in this experience, the accepted one as being with its being thus, and the one that is properly given to me now in the mode, and pre-accepted horizon-like. The fact in the sense of the de facto being world is something that is apperceptively meant in advance, given in the way: „This and that of the world, in the one meant in advance in certainty, is presenting itself, perceptively“ - in a relativity. I thus do not have a ready fact I could change into possibilities, and consider it itself as one of these options, the de facto actualized one. The construction <of the> world accepted by me as being in the range of its options now, that is, in the temporality of my current experience, is prior to the construction of the eidetic options. Or rather: we have an acceptance of being under the title worldly being thing and universally being as a world, in which an infinity of acceptances of the being and of being things that are relatively given acceptance to are included. Each single thing of the world is a synthetic pole of some infinity, presenting itself in each detail of the infinity as a respective „appearance“.[[6]](#footnote-6)

But in each phase of the experience as a „self-giving“ of a real thing (and of the world experience itself) is distinguished something respectively given and its horizon as a horizon of the disjunctive options. The being thing is always related to a disjunctive horizon, in which itself every possibility is a possible appearance and not only some possible ready „being“.

[322] Something being as a real thing is, according to its sense, a pole of subjective appearances. And we have some being thing alone in the subjective, which does not present but is given itself. Construction of the possibility of a world thus presupposes the endless construction of the style of appearance that has to be constructed from the de facto presentation as an endless disjunction.

1. Probably around 1925. - Editor‘s note. [↑](#footnote-ref-1)
2. Logic as a formal mathesis. Ontology of individuality, of a possible nature, of a possible world as such, of possible mentality, common mentality and possible rational humanity as such, etc. Dogmatic basic consideration. [↑](#footnote-ref-2)
3. Compare as well appendix XXV on this (= pages 321f. German edition) - editor‘s note. [↑](#footnote-ref-3)
4. We have the identity of the individual thing in the change of its alterations prior to that. [↑](#footnote-ref-4)
5. Probably around 1925. - Editor‘s note. [↑](#footnote-ref-5)
6. But this needs to be completely explicated. [↑](#footnote-ref-6)